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Phase reference calibration is a necessary procedure in practical continuous-variable measurement-device-
independent quantum key distribution (CV-MDI-QKD) for the need of Bell-State Measurement (BSM). How-
ever, the phase reference calibration may become imperfect in practical applications. We explored the practical
security of CV-MDI-QKD with imperfect phase reference calibration under realistic conditions of lossy and
noisy quantum channel. Specifically, a comprehensive framework is developed to model and characterize the im-
perfection of practical phase reference calibration operation, which is mainly caused by the non-synchronization
of two remote lasers in senders. Security analysis shows that the imperfect phase reference calibration has sig-
nificant side effects on the performance and security of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol. A tight security bound to
excess noise introduced by imperfect phase reference calibration is derived for reverse reconciliation against ar-
bitrary collective attacks in the asymptotic limit, and the tolerance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol to this excess
noise is also obtained. This security analysis framework can eliminate the security hazards caused by imperfect
phase reference calibration without changing the existing CV-MDI-QKD system structure.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1] allows two distant
authenticated users, Alice and Bob, to establish secure key
through untrusted envrionment, which is based on the prin-
ciples of quantum mechanics. There are mainly two cate-
gories of QKD: discrete-variable (DV)QKD protocols [2, 3]
and continuous-variable (CV) QKD protocols [4–7]. CVQKD
utilizes the quadrature components of quantum states to dis-
tribute the secure key, which has unique potentials of being
compatible with standard telecommunication systems and no
request on single-photon detectors. Furthermore, CVQKD al-
low users to approximate the PLOB bound [8], which depicts
the ultimate limit of repeater-less communication.
Theoretically, the Gaussian-modulated CVQKD protocol
using coherent states [5] has been proved to be secure against
arbitrary collective attacks [9] and coherent attacks [10], even
with finite-size regime [11, 12] and composable security [13]
taken into account. Experimentally, this protocol has been
proved to be feasible both in laboratory [6, 14] and field
tests [15]. The Gaussian-modulated CVQKD protocol has ex-
tended the secure transmission over 100 km optical fiber in
the laboratory [16], which shows its potential of applying in
metropolitan quantum networks.
The security analysis of CVQKD relies on some ideal as-
sumptions, which are hard to satisfy in practice [17, 18].
These deviations will bring specific security vulnerabilities to
∗Corresponding author: huang.peng@sjtu.edu.cn
CVQKD system, and the eavesdroppers can utilize this imper-
fection to implement attack strategies, such as local oscillator
fluctuation attack [19], calibration attack [20], wavelength at-
tack [21], detector saturation attack [22]. Obviously, most of
these attack strategies mainly focus on the imperfect detec-
tors. In order to remove these attacks, one solution is to find
and describe these security vulnerabilities, and then propose
corresponding countermeasures. But characterizing all vul-
nerabilities is quite difficult, and the countermeasures will in-
crease the complexity of the system.
Inspired by the idea of entanglement swapping,
measurement-device-independent (MDI) QKD has been
proposed by two groups [23, 24] independently, which can
eliminate all side-channel attacks on detectors. Continuous-
variable MDI-QKD (CV-MDI-QKD) has been proposed and
verified both theoretically and experimentally [25]. Some
theoretical schemes of CV-MDI-QKD have been put forward
one after another in the same period[26–29]. In the theoretic
research of CV-MDI-QKD, some tremendous results have
been achieved in recent years [30–37]. In CV-MDI-QKD
protocols, Alice and Bob are both senders, and measurement
operations are performed by an untrustworthy third party,
Charlie. Charlie performs Bell-State Measurement (BSM)
based on signals sent by Alice and Bob, where the measure-
ment result is communicated publicly and used for generating
the secure keys. Since measurement operations are performed
by untrusted terminal, the security of CV-MDI-QKD does not
depend on the detectors. In other words, CV-MDI-QKD can
eliminate all side-channel attacks against detectors, whether
known or unknown.
In practical system of CV-MDI-QKD, the light sources of
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2Alice and Bob are mutually independent. Therefore, the ini-
tial optical pulses they emit are also independent of each other
and may not stay in the same phase reference frame. For
the need of BSM, we need to calibrate the phase reference
frames between Alice, Bob and Charlie [25]. The basic idea
of phase reference calibration in CV-MDI-QKD is described
as follows: first, we measure the phase difference between
the local oscillator pulses emitted by Alice and Bob. Then,
we take relative phase estimation and correction, adding the
phase difference to one side’s quantum signal pulse. After
these operations, Alice and Bob’s quantum signal pulses are
stay in the same phase reference frame, and Charlie carries
out BSM based on this unified phase reference frame.
Obviously, phase reference calibration is of vital impor-
tance for the construction of experimental framework for CV-
MDI-QKD. Unfortunately, in practical implementation, the
phase reference calibration operation is not as perfect as the-
ory. Due to the non-synchronization of two independent lasers
in Alice and Bob’s sides, which are mainly caused by the sep-
arate spectral linewidths of two lasers , and the uncertainty
of the channel and detection environment, the practical phase
reference calibration operation will become imperfect. If the
imperfection is not taken into account in security analysis, the
security key rate obtained will be higher than the actual value,
which may lead to security hazards. For the accuracy of secu-
rity analysis, in other words, in order to get a tighter bound of
security key rate, we need to precisely characterize the impact
of imperfect phase reference calibration in security analysis
process.
Some latest breakthroughs [38, 39] overcome the non-
ideality brought about by the practical phase reference cali-
bration to a certain extent through the new optical path de-
sign, which simplify the phase reference calibration process.
However, these schemes may increase the complexity of other
aspects of the system, such as detection, optical path and so
on. In addition, these schemes may also introduce additional
excess noise, such as the phase noise between signal pulse
and reference pulse. In this paper, we choose to deal with this
problem from another point of view, that is, to quantitatively
characterize the imperfection of practical phase reference cal-
ibration operation through reasonable modeling, which devel-
ops a comprehensive security framework of CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with imperfect phase reference calibration. The ex-
act formula for calculating excess noise caused by the imper-
fect phase reference calibration is obtained, and then a more
compact and accurate security key rate is derived under ar-
bitrary collective attacks. Based on this, we can qualitatively
and quantitatively analyze the impact of imperfect phase refer-
ence calibration on the performance and security of CV-MDI-
QKD protocol. This security analysis framework can elimi-
nate the security hazards caused by imperfect phase reference
calibration without changing the existing CV-MDI-QKD sys-
tem structure.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In
Sec. II, we first review the structure of CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol, then introduce phase reference calibration in CV-MDI-
QKD protocol and develop a comprehensive framework to ob-
tain the excess noise introduced by imperfect phase reference
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FIG. 1: (Color online). PM version of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
Hom is homodyne detection.
calibration. In Sec. III, we derive the secret key rate of the
CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference cali-
bration, which is more precise and compact than the original
one. In Sec. IV,we give the numerical simulation and per-
formance analysis. Conclusion and discussions are drawn in
Sec. V.
II. CV-MDI-QKD PROTOCOLWITH IMPERFECT PHASE
REFERENCE CALIBRATION
In this section, we first review the CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col, especially the prepare-and-measure (PM) version. Then,
we introduce the phase reference calibration operation in CV-
MDI-QKD protocol and its imperfection in practical imple-
mentation. On the basis of these reviews, we describe and
calculate the excess noise caused by imperfect phase refer-
ence calibration by precise modeling.
A. CV-MDI-QKD Protocol
The construction of CV-MDI-QKD protocol is illustrated in
Fig. 1, which is based on the PM version. The main steps of
PM version can be depicted as follows:
Step 1: Alice and Bob each prepare coherent states and send
them to third-party Charlie through two different quantum
channels with length LAC and LBC , respectively. The coher-
ent state prepared by Alice is |xA + ipA〉, where xA and pA
are Gaussian distributed with modulation variance VAM . The
coherent state prepared by Bob is |xB + ipB〉, where xB and
pB are Gaussian distributed with modulation variance VBM .
Step 2: Charlie performs BSM by interfering the two in-
coming coherent states on a beam splitter and obtaining two
output modes C and D. Then, Charlie use two homodyne
detections to measure the x quadrature of mode C and p
quadrature of mode D and announced the measurement re-
sults {XC , PD} publicly.
Step 3: After receiveing Charlie’s measurement results, Al-
ice keeps her data unchanged, where XA = xA, PA = pA,
while Bob modifies his data to XB = xB + κXC , PB =
pB − κPD. κ is an optimization parameter associated with
quantum channel loss.
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FIG. 2: (Color online). EB version of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
Het is heterodyne detection, Dis is displacement operation, TMSA
and TMSB are two-mode squeezed states.
Step 4: Alice and Bob extract a string of secret key after
carrying out parameter estimation, information reconciliation
and privacy amplification steps through an authenticated pub-
lic channel.
In the equivalent entanglement-based (EB) version, which
is shown in Fig. 2, Alice and Bob prepare two-mode squeezed
states independently and each send one mode to to Charlie for
BSM. After Charlie announced the measurement results, Bob
displaces his retained mode according to the measurement re-
sults, where the gain of the displacement operation is g, while
Alice keeps her mode unchanged. Then, Alice and Bob mea-
sure their modes to obtain the raw data. After the date post-
processing, Alice and Bob obtain the final secret keys.
Before this series of steps, Alice and Bob implement the
phase reference calibration by measuring the phase difference
between the local oscillator pulses emitted by Alice and Bob,
which makes sure that the prepared coherent states (or two-
mode squeezed states) of Alice and Bob stay in the same phase
reference frame.
B. Phase reference calibration in CV-MDI-QKD
This subsection mainly discusses the definition and oper-
ation of phase reference calibration between Alice, Bob and
Charlie in CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
Practically, local oscillator pulses, as the phase reference
light of signal pulse, can be a strong classical light. There-
fore, by interfering two classical local oscillator lights on a
beam splitter, the phase difference of the two local oscillator
pulses can be measured by measuring the intensity of one out-
put beam with photon detector.
We assume that the measurement of phase difference and
phase reference calibration are performed by Bob. Alice sends
her local oscillator pulse to the untrusted third part Charlie .
The schematic diagram of apparatus for measuring the phase
difference of the local oscillator pulses is given in Fig. 3. Alice
divides its local oscillator pulse LOA into two beams, one sent
to Charlie and the other one sent to Bob. Charlie divides the
received beam into two beams as the reference lights of two
balanced homodyne detectors for BSM. After receiving the
local oscillator pulse sent by Alice, Bob divides the received
local oscillator pulse and his own local oscillator pulse LOB
into two beams respectively, and interferences these beams
through BS1 and BS2. In order to measure the phase differ-
ence accurately, pi/2 phase has been added to one of the local
oscillator beams. Then, the phase difference of the two local
oscillator pulses can be obtained by measuring the output in-
terference intensity of one port of BS1 and BS2 respectively
with PD1 and PD2.
The local oscillator pulses LOA and LOB can be denoted
as αALOe
iθA and αBLOe
iθB respectively. |αALO| and |αBLO| are
the amplitude of each local oscillator pulses. θA and θB are
the phase of LOA and LOB, respectively. We suppose αALO =
αBLO = αLO. After local oscillator pulses interferes on these
beam splitters, the amplitude of the light measured by PD1
can be expressed as
β1 =
1√
2
(
αLOe
iθA + αLOe
iθB
)
=
√
2αLOe
i(θA+θB)
2 cos
(
θA−θB
2
)
,
(1)
then the intensity of the light measured by PD1 can be calcu-
lated as
|β1|2 = 2|αLO|2cos2
(
θA−θB
2
)
= |αLO|2 [1 + cos(θA − θB)] .
(2)
Similarly, the intensity of the light measured by PD2 is ob-
tained as
|β2|2 = |αLO|2 [1 + cos(θA − θB − pi/2)]
= |αLO|2 [1 + sin(θA − θB)] .
(3)
According Eq.(2) and Eq.(3), we can obtain the phase differ-
ence between Alice’s and Bob’s local oscillator, ϕcal, which
is calculated as
ϕcal = θA − θB . (4)
After the phase reference calibration operation, the correla-
tion between
(
XALO, P
A
LO
)
and
(
XBLO, P
B
LO
)
can be obtained
by
XBLO = X
A
LO cosϕcal − PALO sinϕcal,
PBLO = X
A
LO sinϕcal + P
A
LO cosϕcal
(5)
Assuming the Alice’s local oscillator has a zero-phase an-
gle, which means PALO = 0, the expression of ϕcal can be
obtained as
ϕcal = tan
−1 (PBLO/XBLO) . (6)
Relatively to local oscillator pulses, the initial quantum sig-
nal pulses modulated by Alice and Bob can be expressed as
αAS e
i(θA+θAM ) and αBS e
i(θB+θBM ) respectively. αAS and α
B
S
are the intensities of their respective signal pulses, θAM and
θBM are their initial modulated phases, respectively. Based
on the phase difference ϕcal between Alice’s and Bob’s lo-
cal oscillator pulses, when Bob modulates his quantum sig-
nal pulses, the phase difference ϕcal and the initial modulated
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FIG. 3: (Color online). Schematic structure of measuring the phase
difference between the local oscillators sending by Alice and Bob in
CV-MDI-QKD protocol. PM is phase modulator. LA is the laser in
Alice’s side, LB is the laser in Bob’s side. LOA and LOB are local
oscillator pulses. PD1 and PD2 are photo detectors. C1 andC2 are
the reference lights of two balanced homodyne detectors for BSM.
BS1 and BS2 are beam-splitters. The ratio of all the beam-splitters
is 50:50.
phase θBM should be added as the modulated phase of his
ultimate modulated quantum signal pulse, which can be ex-
pressed as
αBS e
i(θB+θBM+ϕcal) = αBS e
i(θA+θBM ). (7)
Obviously, Bob’s ultimate modulated quantum signal pulse
is defined in Alice’s quantum signal modulation reference
frame. At this time, Alice and Bob’s quantum signal pulses
share the same phase reference frame.
C. Excess noise introduced by imperfect phase reference
calibration
Theoretically, after local oscillator reference quadrature
measurement, relative phase estimation and correction, Alice
and Bob’s quantum signal pulses are expected to stay in the
same phase reference frame with the phase difference ϕcal.
However, in practice, the phase reference calibration opera-
tion is not as as perfect as in theory, and the estimator ϕˆcal
always has estimation error, which leads to excess noise. In
the case of Gaussian-modulated protocol, we assume the ex-
cess noise introduced by imperfect phase reference calibration
is Gaussian, which is similar with the specific phase noise de-
noted in Ref. [40, 41], can be written as
εprc = 2VM (1− e−Vprc/2), (8)
where VM = VAM = VBM is both the modulation variance
of Alice and Bob, Vprc is the variance of the excess noise
introduced by imperfect phase reference calibration, which is
expressed as [42, 43]
Vprc = var(ϕcal − ϕˆcal). (9)
Assuming that the laser in Alice’s side, LA, have spectral
linewidth ∆νA, and the laser in Bob’s side, LB, have spec-
tral linewidth ∆νB . Both lasers are centered around the same
optical frequency. f is the repetition rate of the system. The
excess noise Vprc is constituted by three terms
Vprc = Vlaser + Vmeasure + Vpath. (10)
The term Vlaser represents the variance of the relative phase
drift between two free-running lasers LA and LB, which can
be obtained as
Vlaser =
2pi
f
(∆νA + ∆νB). (11)
Obviously, Vlaser is caused by the fact that the pulses of LA
and LB are non-synchronization, which mainly leads by the
separate spectral linewidths of two lasers. In the specific sys-
tem of CV-MDI-QKD protocol, Vlaser is a fixed parameter.
The term Vmeasure corresponds to the noise that caused by
the measurement error of the local oscillator phase. In CV-
MDI-QKD protocol, Vmeasure can be expressed as
Vmeasure =
χA+1
|αALO|2
+ χB+1|αBLO|2
= χA+χB+2|αLO|2 ,
(12)
where χA is the total noise imposed on the local oscillator
LOA, which is send by Alice to Charlie, and χB is the total
noise imposed on the local oscillator LOB, which is send by
Bob to Charlie. |αALO| and |αBLO| are the amplitude of the local
oscillators LOA and LOB respectively, and αALO = α
B
LO =
αLO. χA and χB are defined in Eq. (15).
The term Vpath represent the relative phase drift which
caused by the accumulation of the phase difference between
the quantum signal pulse and the local oscillator pulse. Practi-
cally, it is caused by the different optical path lengths between
two kind pulses. In CV-MDI-QKD protocol, the quantum sig-
nal pulse and the local oscillator pulse transmit through the
same optical path each for Alice and Bob. Thus we have
Vpath = 0, and the excess noise Vprc is caused by two ma-
jor components: Vprc = Vlaser + Vmeasure.
When the deviation of ϕˆcal is quite small, Vprc keeps in
a relatively low range. Under this condition, the excess noise
introduced by imperfect phase reference calibration can be ap-
proximated as [42]
εprc = VMVprc
= 2pi VM (∆νA+∆νB)f +
VM (χA+χB+2)
|αLO|2 .
(13)
We denote the transmittance of the quantum channel be-
tween Alice (Bob) and Charlie is TA (TB), and both quantum
channel losses are l = 0.2 dB/km, then the transmittance can be
5given as TA = 10
−lLAC
10 , TB = 10
−lLBC
10 . The excess noise
introduced by two separate quantum channels are εA and εB ,
respectively. εc is the equivalent excess noise introduced by
all quantum channels, which is obtained as
εc = 1 + χA +
TB
TA
(χB − 1)
+TBTA
(√
2
TBg2
√
VB − 1−
√
VB + 1
)2
,
(14)
where VB = VBM +1, g is the amplification coefficient of the
Bob’s displacement in EB version, and
χA =
1
ηA
− 1 + εA, χB = 1
ηB
− 1 + εB . (15)
As g is an optimization parameter, we denote g2 = 2(VB−1)ηB(VB+1)
to minimize ε. Then the optimized equivalent excess noise
introduced by all quantum channels can be calculated as
εc =
TB
TA
(εB − 2) + εA + 2
TA
. (16)
We suppose the homodyne detectors in Charlie are ideal
apparatuses, then the total added noise expressed in shot noise
units is
χt =
1
η
− 1 + εc + εprc, (17)
where η = 12g
2TA is a normalized parameter associated with
the total quantum channel transmittance [27].
III. CALCULATION OF THE SECRET KEY RATE
In this section, we will derive the secret key rate of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol against arbitrary collective attacks with
considering the imperfection of practical phase reference cal-
ibration operation.
In this paper, we mainly focus on the one-mode attack,
where Eve takes entangling cloner attacks on each quantum
channel independently. We should point out that this attack
strategy is not the optimal one. The two-mode attack [25],
where Eve takes correlated two-mode coherent Gaussian at-
tack on two quantum channels by employing their interac-
tions, is demonstrated to be the optimal attack strategy against
the CV-MDI-QKD protocol. However, when the two quan-
tum channels come from different directions, their correlation
should be very weak, and it is extremely difficult for Eve to
employ the correlation in practice. In this context, we ap-
proximately reduce the quantum channel of CV-MDI-QKD
to one-mode channel, and one-mode attack can work effi-
ciently. In addition, when TMSB and the displacement op-
eration are regarded as manipulated by Eve, the EB version of
CV-MDI-QKD protocol can be simplify to an equivalent one-
way CVQKD protocol. Then we can use the secret key rate of
equivalent one-way protocol to obtain the lower bound of the
secret key rate of our protocol
Considering the lossy and noisy quantum channel and im-
perfection of practical phase reference calibration, the covari-
ance matrix of ρA1B′1 in EB version can be expressed as
γA1B′1 =
 aI2 cσz
cσz bI2

=
 V I2 √η(V 2 − 1)σz√
η(V 2 − 1)σz η (V + χt) I2
 ,
(18)
where I2 is 2 × 2 identity matrix, σz = diag(1,−1), V =
VA = VB = VM + 1.
The secret key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with im-
perfect phase reference calibration under reverse reconcilia-
tion can be calculated as
Kprc = βIAB − χBE , (19)
where β is the reconciliation efficiency, χBE is the Holevo
bound [44] which defines the maximum information available
to Eve on Bob’s key, IAB is the mutual information between
Alice and Bob, which can be calculated by [44]
IAB = 2× 1
2
log2
[
a+ 1
a+ 1− c2/(b+ 1)
]
. (20)
The Holevo boundχBE is given as
χBE = S (ρE)−
∫
dmBp (mB)S (ρ
mB
E ) , (21)
where S is the Von Neumann entropy of the quantum state ρ,
mB represents the measurement of Bob, p(mB) is the prob-
ability density of the measurement, ρmBE is Eve’s state con-
ditional on Bob’s measurement result. Based on the fact that
ρmBA1 is independent of mB for Gaussian protocols, and Eve
purifies the system A1B′1, χBE can be obtained as
χBE = S
(
ρA1B′1
)− S (ρmBA1 ) , (22)
where S
(
ρA1B′1
)
is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues
λ1,2 of γA1B′1 characterizing the state ρA1B′1 , with the form
S
(
ρA1B′1
)
= G[(λ1 − 1)/2] +G[(λ2 − 1)/2], (23)
and S
(
ρmBA1
)
is a function of the symplectic eigenvalues λ3 of
γmBA1 characterizing the state ρ
mB
A1
, with the form
S
(
ρmBA1
)
= G[(λ3 − 1)/2], (24)
where the Von Neumann entropy
G (x) = (x+ 1) log2(x+ 1)− xlog2x. (25)
The symplectic eigenvalues λ1,2 can be calculated by
λ21,2 =
1
2
(
A±
√
A2 − 4B2
)
, (26)
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FIG. 4: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of VM in the
extreme asymmetric case, where Charlie is extremely close to Bob.
Transmission distances D = LAC are set to 10 km, 20 km and 30
km. N0 is the shot noise variance. PRC is phase reference calibra-
tion. The solid lines denote the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with ideal
phase reference calibration, the dashed lines denote the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference calibration. Param-
eters are fixed as follows: εA = εB = 0.002, Vlaser = 0.005,
|αLO|2/VM = 108, reconciliation efficiency β = 96%.
with the notations
A = a2 + b2 − 2c2 = V 2 + η2(V + χt)2 − 2η(V 2 − 1),
B = ab− c2 = η(V χt + 1).
(27)
The covariance matrix of the state ρmBA1 can be calculated as
γmBA1 = aI2 − cσz(bI2 + I2)−1cσz
= [a− c2/(b+ 1)]I2,
(28)
then the symplectic eigenvalues λ3 is given by
λ3 = a− c2/(b+ 1) = ηV χt + V + η
η(V + χt) + 1
. (29)
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we give the numerical simulation and pro-
vide the sufficient analysis of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol
with imperfect phase reference calibration compared with pre-
vious works which do not consider the impact of imperfect
phase reference calibration.
In CV-MDI-QKD protocols, the asymmetric case, where
LAC 6= LBC has obvious advantage in performance com-
pared with the symmetric case, where LAC = LBC [25],
and the extreme asymmetric case, where Charlie is extremely
close to Bob [27] has the optimal performance. In other
words, the shorter the distance between Bob and Charlie, the
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FIG. 5: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of the trans-
mission distance in the extreme asymmetric case, where Charlie is
extremely close to Bob. The uppermost heavy solid line denotes the
PLOB bound. The thin solid lines denotes with the CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with ideal phase reference calibration. The dashed lines de-
note the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference cal-
ibration, where Vlaser are set to 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02 with the units of
shot noise (N0).Parameters are fixed as follows: εA = εB = 0.002,
|αLO|2/VM = 108, modulation variance VM = 6, reconciliation
efficiency β = 96%.
better the performance we can obtain. On the contrary, it will
degrade the performance of the system. Employing the same
parameters, the extreme asymmetric case can obtain the max-
imal transmission distance, which is more suitable for point-
to-point communications. In short-range network applications
where the relay needs to be in the middle of the legitimate
communication parties, the symmetric case is more suitable
and has unique potentials. Our following analysis is based on
two cases.
A. Performance analysis in the extreme asymmetric case
The modulation variance VM is critical to the performance
and security of CV-MDI-QKD protocol. Before obtaining the
secret key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect
phase reference calibration as a function of transmission dis-
tance in the extreme asymmetric case, we need to know how
the secret key rate changes with the modulation variance in
order to obtain the optimal modulation variance. We plot the
secret key rates as a function of the modulation variance VM
with different transmission distance in the extreme asymmet-
ric case, for both the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with ideal phase
reference calibration and the protocol with imperfect phase
reference calibration, which is shown Fig. 4. There are two
key parameters, Vlaser and |αLO|2/VM , directly decide the
impact of imperfect phase reference calibration on the proto-
col. Vlaser is related with the spectral linewidth of two free-
running lasers and the repetition rate of the system. We denote
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The dashed lines denote the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect
phase reference calibration, where transmission distances D = LAC
is set to 20 km and |αLO|2/VM are set to 108, 103 and 102. The
solid line denotes the initial secret key rate of CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol with imperfect phase reference calibration, where transmission
distances D = LAC = 0 km and |αLO|2/VM = 108. Parame-
ters are fixed as follows: εA = εB = 0.002, modulation variance
VM = 6, reconciliation efficiency β = 96%.
Vlaser = 0.005 based on the parameters of the practical equip-
ment. |αLO|2/VM is related with the light intensity of local
oscillators pulse. We choose |αLO|2/VM = 108, which is the
value commonly used in practical CV systems.
Obviously, when considering the imperfection of practi-
cal phase reference calibration, the practicable VM values are
much lower than the one without taking this imperfection into
account, which means that we need to set the modulation vari-
ance more strictly under the condition of imperfect phase ref-
erence calibration. In addition, when transmission distance
increases, the optional areas of VM are gradually compressed
and the secret key rate decreases evidently. There is a note-
worthy phenomenon that, under the fixed parameters, the op-
timal value of VM for the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with im-
perfect phase reference calibration, which leads to the best
performance, is always about 6 in short noise units. Hence, in
the next analysis of the extreme asymmetric case, we always
denote VM = 6.
The plot of Fig. 5 shows the secret key rates as a func-
tion of the transmission distance in the extreme asymmet-
ric case, for both the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect
phase reference calibration and the one with ideal phase ref-
erence calibration. Besides, different values of Vlaser are tak-
ing into account for the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imper-
fect phase reference calibration, and the PLOB bound is plot-
ted as a reference for performance comparison. Here we de-
note |αLO|2/VM = 108 as a fixed value. As shown in the
figure, the performance curve of the CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col with imperfect phase reference calibration is always lower
than that of the one without considering this imperfection, and
the gap between the former curve and the PLOB bound is al-
ways larger than that between the later curve and the PLOB
bound. Furthermore, the gap between these two performance
curves will become larger and lager with the value of Vlaser
increases, and the performance of the CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col with imperfect phase reference calibration reduces rapidly
with Vlaser increases.
On the one hand, these phenomena indicate that the imper-
fect phase reference calibration will significantly cut down the
performance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol and the reduction
is more obvious with the larger Vlaser. On the other hand, it
shows that a more compact security key rate can be obtained
by incorporating consideration of the imperfect phase refer-
ence calibration into security analysis.
Fig. 6 depicts the secret key rates as a function of Vlaser
in the extreme asymmetric case, for the CV-MDI-QKD pro-
tocol with imperfect phase reference calibration. The lower
dashed lines denote the case of secret key rate changing with
Vlaser under fixed transmission distance and different value of
|αLO|2/VM . On one hand, when the local oscillator pulse is
too weak, the coherent detectors can not work effectively. On
the other hand, when the local oscillator pulse is too strong, it
will exceed the performance of the coherent detectors. There-
fore, in the practical system, we take the intensity of local
oscillator pulse as a fixed range, which leads the value of
|αLO|2/VM is always around 108.
Although the value of |αLO|2/VM has been limited in the
practical system, we still need to consider its impact on sys-
tem security, as it is an important parameter in the calcula-
tion formula of εprc. According to the figure, we can obtain
that the value of |αLO|2/VM and the performance of the pro-
tocol are negatively correlated. However, when |αLO|2/VM
is lager than 104, its effect on the performance of the proto-
col is negligible. Therefore, in practical systems, even if the
value of |αLO|2/VM fluctuates around 108, it will not have
a significant impact on the security key rate. In other words,
the effect of |αLO|2/VM on the performance of the protocol
is not obvious in practice. Hence, in the extreme asymmetric
case, the most important parameter affecting the impact of im-
perfect phase reference calibration in practical CV-MDI-QKD
systems is Vlaser.
The upper solid line denotes the initial secret key rate of
CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference cal-
ibration, where transmission distances D = LAC = 0 km
and |αLO|2/VM = 108. This line shows the tolerance of the
CV-MDI-QKD protocol to Vlaser when the CV-MDI-QKD
system works properly. Under the fixed parameters, the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol will have no secret key rate when Vlaser
lager than 0.03665. In other words, in the extreme asymmetric
case, the upper limit of system tolerance to Vlaser is 0.03663,
and the tolerance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol to the excess
noise εprc introduced by imperfect phase reference calibration
is obtained as about 0.03663VM in short noise units.
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FIG. 7: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of VM in the
symmetric case, where Charlie is in the middle of Alice and Bob.
Transmission distances D = LAC + LBC are set to 2 km, 3 km
and 4 km. N0 is the shot noise variance. PRC is phase reference
calibration. The solid lines denote the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with
ideal phase reference calibration, the dashed lines denote the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference calibration. Pa-
rameters are fixed as follows: εA = εB = 0.002, Vlaser = 0.005,
|αLO|2/VM = 108, reconciliation efficiency β = 96%.
B. Performance analysis in the symmetric case
In the symmetric case, the untrusted third part Charlie is
right in the middle of Alice and Bob, which is quite suitable
for the applications where two legitimate parties are roughly
equidistant from a public server. Same as the previous subsec-
tion, we should obtain the optimal value of VM before simu-
lating the secret key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with
imperfect phase reference calibration in the symmetric case.
The plot of Fig. 7 shows the secret key rates as a function
of the modulation variance VM with different transmission
distance in the symmetric case, for both the CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with ideal phase reference calibration and the proto-
col with imperfect phase reference calibration. The feasible
range of VM in the latter is much smaller than that in the for-
mer. Considering the imperfection of phase reference calibra-
tion, with transmission distance increases, the optional areas
of VM are gradually compressed, which is similar to what is
shown in Fig. 4. Under the fixed parameters, the optimal value
of VM in the symmetric case is about 12.
The plot of Fig. 8 shows the secret key rates as a func-
tion of the transmission distance in the symmetric case, for
both the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect phase refer-
ence calibration and the one with ideal phase reference cali-
bration. The modulation variance VM of both protocols are all
set to 12, |αLO|2/VM is also fixed as 108. Same as the anal-
ysis of Fig. 5, the performance of the CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col with imperfect phase reference calibration is always worse
than that of the one without considering this imperfection, and
the gap will become lager rapidly with Vlaser increases. Fur-
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FIG. 8: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of the transmis-
sion distance in the symmetric case, where Charlie is in the middle
of Alice and Bob. The uppermost heavy solid line denotes the PLOB
bound. The thin solid lines denotes with the CV-MDI-QKD proto-
col with ideal phase reference calibration. The dashed lines denote
the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference calibra-
tion, where Vlaser are set to 0.005, 0.01 and 0.02 with the units of
shot noise (N0).Parameters are fixed as follows: εA = εB = 0.002,
|αLO|2/VM = 108, modulation variance VM = 12, reconciliation
efficiency β = 96%.
thermore, for both the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imper-
fect phase reference calibration and the one with ideal phase
reference calibration, the maximal transmission distances of
the symmetric case are less than a tenth of these of the ex-
treme asymmetric case. The secret key rate of the CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference calibration in
the symmetric case looks more sensitive to the change of
Vlaser than that in the extreme asymmetric case, which will
be confirmed in Fig. 9.
Fig. 9 depicts the secret key rates of the CV-MDI-QKD
protocol with imperfect phase reference calibration as a func-
tion of Vlaser in the symmetric case, with different values of
|αLO|2/VM and transmission distance. Similar to what is
shown in Fig. 6, although |αLO|2/VM and the performance
of the protocol have negative correlation, when |αLO|2/VM
surpasses 104, its effect on the performance of the protocol is
not worth mentioning. So the most critical parameter for de-
termining the impact of the imperfect phase reference calibra-
tion in practical CV-MDI-QKD systems is still Vlaser in the
symmetric case. The upper solid line shows the tolerance of
the CV-MDI-QKD protocol to Vlaser in the symmetric case,
where the the upper limit of Vlaser is 0.0220. It shows that the
secret key rate of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with imperfect
phase reference calibration in the symmetric case looks more
sensitive to Vlaser than that in the extreme asymmetric case.
Then, the tolerance of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol to εprc can
be calculated as about 0.0220VM in short noise units.
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FIG. 9: (Color online). Secret key rates as a function of Vlaser in
the symmetric case, where Charlie is in the middle of Alice and
Bob. The dashed lines denote the CV-MDI-QKD protocol with
imperfect phase reference calibration, where transmission distances
D = LAC +LBC is set to 3 km and |αLO|2/VM are set to 108, 103
and 102. The solid lines denote the initial secret key rate of CV-MDI-
QKD protocol with imperfect phase reference calibration, where
transmission distances D = LAC = 0 km and |αLO|2/VM = 108.
Parameters are fixed as follows: εA = εB = 0.002, modulation
variance VM = 12, reconciliation efficiency β = 96%.
V. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the imperfection of
practical phase reference calibration operation on the secu-
rity of CV-MDI-QKD protocol, which is caused by the non-
synchronization of two remote lasers in senders and has not
been taken into account in previous security analysis of this
protocol. We developed a comprehensive security framework
to model and characterize this imperfection. Through reason-
able modeling, the effect of this imperfection on the secu-
rity of the CV-MDI-QKD protocol is equivalent to the excess
noise εprc introduced by imperfect phase reference calibra-
tion. A tight bound of the security key rate is derived under
arbitrary collective attacks. The qualitative and quantitative
security analysis shows that the imperfect phase reference cal-
ibration will damage the performance and security of the CV-
MDI-QKD protocol. This work will get ride of the security
hazards led by the imperfect phase reference calibration with-
out the adjustment of the protocol structure.
In the analysis of εprc, we find that the most critical
parameter for determining the impact of the imperfect phase
reference calibration in practical CV-MDI-QKD systems is
Vlaser, which is a fixed parameter in the specific system and
decided by the spectral linewidth of two free-running lasers
and the repetition rate f of the system. We usually choose
f below 100 MHz with considing the current bandwidth
limitation of shot-noise limited coherent detectors. In order
to minimize Vlaser, we can choose low-phase-noise lasers,
such as external-cavity lasers (ECL), whose typical spectral
linewidth is of a few kHz [40]. In this case, Vlaser may
even be less than 10−4. The participation of such equipment
can effectively narrow the impact of the imperfect phase
reference calibration on the security and performance of
CV-MDI-QKD protocol. In future work, we will strive to
design a comprehensive security architecture to characterize
the overall practical security of CV-MDI-QKD protocol.
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